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Abstract 
 
We study experimentally the impact of pre-play social interactions on negotiations. We isolate 
the impact of several common components of interactions: conversations, food, and alcoholic or 
non-alcoholic beverages. Participants perform a standardized negotiation (complex and simple) 
under six conditions: without interaction, interaction only, and interactions with water, wine, 
water and food and wine and food. We find that none of the treatments improves the outcomes 
over the treatment without interactions. We also study trust and reciprocity, where we find the 
same lack of superiority of interaction. 
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1. Introduction 
Many transactions in economic life take place after social interactions. They are central at the 
start of business, government, and personal negotiations and other social, political and economic 
processes. These interactions are important in the culture of organizations all over the globe.  
As an example of their perceived importance, the following quote from Harvard’s Program on 
Negotiation1 is illustrative: “The reciprocal nature of trust reinforces the value of taking time to get to know 
the other party and build rapport before you begin to negotiate. Don’t assume that you can form a bond simply by 
exchanging a few friendly e-mails before meeting in person. Rather, try to forge a personal connection by meeting for 
an informal lunch or two.”  
Policymakers have taken this kind of advice to heart. For example, business meals tend to be tax-
deductible at least in part. The IRS considers that 50% of such expenses are deductible in 
general.2 The HMRC allows to deduct the part of the expense that is “wholly and exclusively” 
for the purpose of generating profits.3 However, it is not only a matter for private businesses. 
Government offices and universities also subsidize business meals. Given this perceived 
importance, it is rather surprising that there has been very little research effort to ascertain its 
actual impact to improve substantive economic outcomes. 
Real negotiations often involve many issues, over which participants usually have diverse 
preferences. Under incomplete information about those preferences, it is easy for negotiations 
outcomes to reach inefficient solutions. Our main goal is to investigate if social interactions with 
strangers improve negotiations’ efficiency through trust building. One initial difficulty to achieve 
our goal is that these interactions are complicated processes involving many components. The 
potential success of the complete process might not be able to tell us the role played by its 
different constituents. For example, the business meal preceding a negotiation involves 
communication, and other aspects, such as food and beverage intake. Of course, negotiations 
preceded by communication are commonplace outside business as well, in ceasefire or peace 
talks, or in political negotiations. As stated in Seabright (2006), “a telling piece of evidence in 
support of the signalling theory of laughter is the way in which, across all kinds of cultures in the 
world, people who have made a business deal with each other tend to seal the deal by having a 
drink together.[…]. At the same time as it disables people’s capacity for exercising trust wisely, 
 
1 https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/dealmaking-daily/dealmaking-negotiations-how-to-build-trust-at-the-
bargaining-Table/ Retrieved on September 5, 2017 
2 http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc512.html Retrieved on September 5, 2017 
3 http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/bimmanual/bim37000.htm Retrieved on September 5, 2017 
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alcohol enables people to inspire trust by stimulating that excellent signal of positive affect, 
namely laughter, that is not under direct voluntary control." 
For this reason, we designed an experiment that would allow us to distinguish the effect of 
different factors on the negotiations. Our main finding is straightforward. We find no significant 
effect of any of our treatments with social interaction over the baseline of no interaction at all. In 
the words of the HMRC, the part of the expense that is wholly and exclusively for the purpose 
of generating profits is, on the basis of our experiment, zero. The same result arises for trust and 
reciprocity.   
The participants in our experiment were master students at the Burgundy School of Business in 
Dijon. This is an elite business school in the Bourgogne region of France. They were recruited 
for a wine tasting activity followed (or preceded) by some games. After gathering the participants 
had 30 minutes to interact, except in the control treatment, where there was no interaction. 
Then, they read the experimental instructions.  
During the Interaction Phase, participants were assigned randomly to only one of five treatments, 
or to the control. The treatments differed depending on the availability of food and drinks. They 
were as follows (obviously all of them involve interaction): interaction only, water, wine, food 
and water, food and wine. After the interaction, they participated in a four-player strategy-
method trust game (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 1995). We made an extra effort so that the 
setting was as natural as possible. For instance, we allocated desks and participants in circles of 
four facing each other. An indication that this effort was successful comes from the unexpected 
high level of trust observed in the entire experiment. 
After the interaction phase, participants took part in a incentivized negotiation of a kind that is 
common in negotiation classes. They negotiate over a labor contract with many attributes, each 
of which carrying a different number of points for each possible agreement. Participants’ 
payments were a function of their total points, but they knew only their own points. This 
incomplete information about the others’ points, and hence the possible beneficial trade-offs, 
was meant to create the opportunity for social interaction to increase trust and efficiency. Parties 
can find solutions that were not obvious if they exchange information.  
 4 
We study two forms of negotiation (between subjects): Half of the subjects played a “hard” 
negotiation involving five issues; the other half a “simple” negotiation with two issues.4 We 
administered a de-briefing questionnaire at the end of the experiment. 
Regarding the form of pre-play interaction we ran many treatments because our prior belief 
indicated that some form of pre-play interaction would indeed improve negotiations, and thus 
we wanted to find out the (possibly synergistic) impact of the different constituents. As it turned 
out, nothing appears to work better than moving directly into negotiations (no interaction). This 
is true at the pair level, that is, there is no gain in the total number of points achieved in the 
negotiations. It is also true at the individual level, as there seems to be no higher dispersion, nor 
a particular side that gains through communication. We conjecture that the initial interactions 
serve a psychological need to lighten the load of an unpleasant task. We could say that pre-play 
social interaction is more of a consumption good than a production input. As such, its tax status 
might need a revision if future research on this topic confirms our results. 
With respect to trust, no treatment improved in a significant way the level of trust from the 
baseline treatment: trust in the “no interaction” treatment was either equal or, in a couple of 
cases superior, every other treatment.  
In reciprocity we do not find any effect. Hence, there are no significant gains for more complex 
interaction settings (vs. the no interaction at all). 
Our results have important policy implications. There is a general belief both in the business 
world and in government, that interactions benefit their organizational performance. We have 
cast serious doubt on that belief. The results are also important to understand the determinants 
of trust, a very important driver of economic progress.5 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 
describes the experimental design. Section 4 establishes the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
  
 
4
 It may not be clear ex-ante whether two or five issues are “more difficult” generally, since the tradeoffs, and thus 
agreement possibilities, multiply with a higher number of issues. But the cognitive load of finding those agreements 
is certainly higher. And our results show that efficiency is indeed higher in what we call simple negotiations. 
5 Trust has been shown to induce higher growth levels for countries, as in Zak and Knack (2001) and Algan and 
Cahuc (2010). 
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2. Related literature 
One of the oft-stated purposes of pre-negotiation meetings is the building of “trust”, personal 
bonds or increase altruism towards the participants. It can also signal intentions or the 
negotiating type. For example, one could try to establish a certain “toughness” in character. 
Previous research has established that cheap-talk prior to playing a game can improve efficiency. 
Cooper et al. (1992), Charness (2000) or Clark et al. (2001) show that cheap-talk increases 
efficiency in coordination games. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991) have done the same for public 
good games, and Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) in trust games. There are also some results in 
bargaining games that are closer to our object of interest. Valley et al. (2002) studied a double 
oral auction with and without communication. They found that communication allowed to 
achieve higher levels of efficiency than predicted by theory. Forsythe et al. (1991) showed that 
communication during a bargaining game did not improve the efficiency of negotiated outcomes. 
Our experiments allow for communication in a diverse set of environments; communication is 
conducted prior to the game, as well as during it, and our negotiation simulations are more 
realistic.6 
There is a recent strand of the literature focusing on the effect of alcohol and glucose in various 
economically relevant contexts. In contrast to that literature, we provide a far more 
comprehensive look at the problem, since we decompose the social interaction problem in all its 
constituents, of which alcohol and food consumption are only a part.  
Alcohol consumption has been shown to be positively associated with risk taking (Proestakis et 
al. 2013 however, Burghart et al. 2013 found different results for men and women), rejection of 
unfair offers (Morewedge et al. 2014) as well as trust (Attanasi et al. 2013)7. Interestingly, from 
the latter paper it appears that it is not generalized trust, but instantaneous trust, related to the 
specific group sharing the substance. In the lab, results have not been consistent: Corazzini et al. 
(2015) did not detect any effect of alcohol in depleting subjects’ risk tolerance. However, they 
found that alcohol intoxication increases impatience and makes subjects less altruistic. Bregu et 
al. (2017) found no effect of alcohol on decision-making (including games), but contrary to 
Corazzini et al. (2015), found dictators that are more generous. 
This, however, is in stark contrast with the results of Schweitzer and Gomberg (2001) who find 
that alcohol, even at levels that in some American states are below the legal limits for driving, 
seriously lowers the efficiency of outcomes, by reducing the total number of earned points, and 
 
6
 Berkman et al. (2015) study the role of socialisation on cooperation. They also use a pre-play communication phase 
where subjects interact in pairs under a well-defined structure. 
7
 A caveat in this case is that this is a survey, not an experiment, and certainly not a game. 
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hence the final payment to both partners. This happens through a variety of processes: they use 
more aggressive tactics, less integrative tactics (Thompson, 1991) and make more mistakes.  
One way to understand the previous conflicting results comes from a different literature, 
focusing on the effects of glucose in decision-making. Gailliot and Baumeister (2007) use a 
variety of sources to claim that lower glucose levels reduce self-control. Alcohol consumption 
depletes glucose levels, and hence self-control, so the joint consumption of food and alcohol 
might give markedly different effects than alcohol on its own. However, a meta-analysis by Dang 
(2016) casts serious doubts on the view that glucose depletes self-control. 
 
3. Experimental design 
We invited the participants to our experiment to participate in wine tasting activities, followed 
(or preceded) by modified versions of the classic trust game (Berg et al.  1995) and of the 
negotiation game introduced by Schweitzer and Gomberg (2001).8 Our experiment had a 
sequential structure intended to fulfil two requirements: constructing a proper setup to study 
social interactions around a Table and introducing wine and meals in that particular environment 
as to measure whether the use of those additional activities may affect social interactions.  
We recruited 568 participants from the student population of the first year of the Master Grande 
École from the School of Wine and Spirits Business and the Burgundy School of Business (BSB) 
from Dijon, France, in November 2015 and November 2016. We chose the timing (very soon 
after the classes start) and participants (first year students) so that, together with random 
matching, we minimized the chance that participants were in groups where member had already 
established a relationship. The BSB school has a good index of social diversity (it is ranked third 
in France), which means that participants are quite a good representation of the French 
population (30% of students at BSB are recipients of social scholarships which is the highest 
percentage in France).9 The sample is also externally valid since these student are meant, for 
more than 90% of them, to become managers or entrepreneurs, and be in charge of negotiations 
in their future businesses. 
 
8
 No any participant was deceived. All the participants in the experiment did eventually take part in a wine tasting 
session. Those for whom wine was not part of the treatment had the wine tasting after the experiment. 
9
 However, note that BSB students enter the school after a 2 years intensive preparation in special schools called 
“préparatoire” in which they are admitted based on their grades and an exam. Also, at the end of the 2 years, they 
need to pass a quite selective entrance exam to BSB (which has 4000 applicants for 450 places). This process means 
that BSB students are very good students, and they come from good high schools, mostly from big cities. 
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Participants were invited to participate in a wine-testing event (something that occurs often at 
the BSB) and told they would also play some games. The invitations to such events (and more 
generally to paid experiments) are familiar and in accordance to the ethical standards of drinking 
alcohol inside the school (BSB has a main program in the School of Wine) and minimize both 
selection biases and experimenter demand effects. We reminded participants, as usual, not to 
consume alcohol before arriving at the study, not to eat for 2 hours prior to the experiment, and 
to bring a valid form of identification to verify their age. Most experiments started at 11 am.10 
We chose the timing on the advice from experts on wine tasting from the school, because the 
mouth is best prepared two to three hours after breakfast. The experiment last on average 1 hour 
30 minutes, including reading instructions, answering comprehension questions, decisions and 
payments. Participants earned on average 20.50€ (min 5€, max 38€) in addition to the 
participation fee of 5€. We assigned participants to a treatment or a session randomly upon 
arrival. One participant was involved in only one session and one treatment in a typical between-
subjects design.  
Participants arrived at the laboratory and waited in the corridor as they usually do for 
experiments. We gave them anonymous numbers, so they had to sit at the numbered places. 
However, the numbers were given (without specific emphasis) in such a way that this resulted in 
sitting in the lab in groups of four same-gender individuals.11 In some sessions, at the beginning 
of the experiment, participants were seated in individual isolated cubicles, and in other sessions, 
in four-person isolated cubicles, according to the treatment. In case of non-appearance of some 
participants, some four same-gender groups were incomplete – those participants were seated in 
mixed groups of four and allowed to participate to the experiment, but the data collected was 
not used for further analyses. Data from mixed groups (32 participants) are not considered for 
the analysis.12 The final sample amount 536 participants. 
The Interaction Phase (see Figure 1 below) consisted in a 30 minutes period of (pre-play) 
communication. In other experiments on pre-play communication, (see e.g. Bornstein and 
Rapoport 1988, or Bochet et al 2009 for public good games, and Zultan 2012 for ultimatum 
games) the period of communication is far shorter, a few short minutes. We thought that our 
more complicated game required a longer period to build the right amount of trust. Some of our 
participants did not participate to the Interaction Phase, according to the treatment. Participants 
 
10
 A few sessions needed to be scheduled before or after 11AM due to room availability issues. 
11
 To be more precise, say the session consisted of X people, X/2 men and X/2 women. We paired them randomly 
inside each group. Numbers from 1 to X/2 were distributed randomly to men, and numbers between X/2+1 and X 
to the women (or vice versa). Participants were then called by numbers to go to sit a specific Table. 
12
 We conducted analysis with these omitted groups for robustness. Results, available upon request, are not affected 
by their inclusion. 
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involved in sessions with the Interaction Phase were seated in four-person isolated cubicles and 
were allowed to talk. We divided this phase in two conditions: in one condition, the Interaction 
Phase was unstructured – participants simply performed pre-play verbal communication. In the 
other condition, the Interaction Phase was structured by its concomitance with the Tasting 
Phase, i.e. the introduction of liquids with or without nibbles. One could interpret this as team-
building exercise that participants do together, requiring communication. In this way, Interaction 
can be viewed as “Unstructured” communication” and Tasting as “Structured” communication. 
The reason for these variations is that we do not have a good theory for what is it about 
communication that may help negotiation, so we needed to test different formats.  
 
Figure 1. Experimental phases (t+1 is removed for No Interaction) 
 
To avoid any deception, all our participants took part in the Tasting Phase, either at the 
beginning or at the end of the experimental session. Participants were presented with three 
standard INAO glasses containing the standard quantity of tasting liquids (1cl). The Tasting 
Phase was declined in four conditions: the liquid contained in the glasses was water, wine, and in 
some tasting exercises wine or water were accompanied by side nibbles. Glasses were presented 
in a "blind" tasting condition, i.e. without any indication of the label, price or other identifying 
information on the liquid. Glasses were only identified with neutral numerical codes. Participants 
were instructed to indicate on an individual answer sheet which glass of liquid they preferred at 
three specific moments: after they first took the first gulp from each of the glasses, after the 5th 
gulp and after the 10th gulp. This procedure is standard in the tasting exercises, as perception 
changes with time and sensorial familiarity. However, we motivated the consumption of liquids 
as participants were by default not allowed to spit (spitting devices were not provided).  
At the end of the Tasting Phase, participants were instructed to leave their glasses and the 
answer sheets on the Table at the exact same places they were when they arrived. After finalising 
the sessions and before the participants left the room, we conducted Breathalyzer tests on 
everyone and recorded results from each participant. Participants were not provided with their 
scores, however, inebriated participants (with a score higher than .05) were asked to remain in 
t
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Negotiation
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the laboratory to watch a movie, as is the standard procedure in tasting sessions. After the 
participants left the room, we collected the answer sheets and measured the remaining liquid in 
each glass as to have a precise measure of the liquid intake.  
The Trust Game/Risk Preferences elicitation Phase consisted first in a variant of the traditional 
trust game. In a (sequential) Trust game, two players played the following roles: the sender (S) is 
endowed with certain money, P. S may send any fraction x of P (even nothing) to the other 
player, the receiver (R). Transferred money is tripled, R is entitled to return any amount (even 0). 
Rules are common knowledge. We interpret S's choices as a signal of trust (the higher the better) 
while R choices indicate reciprocity (idem). In our variant, participants read the experimental 
instructions individually in their own cabin. Every subject had an endowment of 10 euros. They 
played a double role: every participant is both S and R. Each of them played a Trust Game with 
the other 3 players from its group (sending and receiving, instructions available in Appendix). 
One decision was paid randomly. Participants were also asked to reveal their expectations about 
the behavior of others. Then participants completed a Risk Preferences elicitation task 
(incentivized), following the standard procedure -multiple prices lists- proposed by Holt and 
Laury (2002).  
The Negotiation Phase consisted in a variant of the negotiating exercise from Schweitzer and 
Gomberg (2001). Participants were paired two by two in same-gender dyads. We separated the 
genders to avoid the complicated issues that arise from inter-gender negotiations (see e.g. 
Stuhlmacher and Walter 1999, Babcock and Laschever 2009, Bear and Babcock 2012).  The 
exercise included two roles, an employer and a placement agent who negotiate over a 
compensation package for a prospective employee. The negotiation involved a Hard or an Easy 
Negotiation condition, consisting of two or five issues (wage, bonuses, trips, etc…) and included 
opportunities to create joint gains. Participants were then randomly assigned to the role of either 
agent or employer. They were described their role and were allowed to make notes on their 
confidential information sheets. The exercise consisted in structuring a job offer and closing a 
deal for a previously interviewed candidate. The job description and candidate’s resume are 
included in Appendix A (Experimental instructions – Hard negotiation, Employer). Both 
participants received private information describing their interests and how these interests 
converted to point values. The last page of the instructions was a Table of point values including 
one of the two columns of values represented in the payoff Table in Appendix. Participants were 
informed that the points they earned in the negotiation would be converted to cash at an 
exchange rate of 10 points to 1 euro, and that they would earn nothing if they failed to reach an 
agreement. Once participants reached an agreement, we collected their agreement sheets.  
 10 
In the Questionnaire Phase we collected data on the questions used in Schweitzer and Gomberg 
(2001): participants were asked about the negotiation process, their perceptions of how alcohol 
had affected their negotiation13, and general demographic information. They were also measured 
their height and weighted. Finally, participants were asked demographic information, such us 
height, weight, age, and gender. 
These different phases lead to several treatments (all these variations occur at t+1 - see Figure 1): 
No-Interaction, Unstructured Communication (in short Interaction), and Structured Communication 
(StrComm). These three treatments represent three possible baselines and have variants.  
The StrComm treatment mimics business meals with water as the base liquid. We run three 
variations of this treatment:  
• StrComm+W (identical to the former StrComm with wine instead of water),  
• StrComm+N (identical to StrComm plus a Nibble) and 
• StrComm+W+N which combines the Wine and the Nibble.  
In the No-Interaction treatment (t+1 is absent), participants only participated in the Trust Game, 
Risk, Negotiation and Questionnaire. To avoid deception the Tasting Phase was placed at the 
end of the experiment. 
In the Interaction treatment, the sequence of phases consisted of Interaction, Trust Game, Risk, 
Negotiation Game and Questionnaire. Again the Tasting Phase was placed at the end.  
In the four Structured Communication treatments, the phases were as reflected in Figure 1: 
Interaction and Tasting (simultaneous), Trust Game, Risk, Negotiation and Questionnaire.  
All in all, our setup was intended to put participants at ease and relaxed, and to make the 
situation as natural as possible. Although the sessions were conducted in the laboratory, the 
physical allocation of desks in circles, the position of participants facing each other and so on 
had the purpose of reducing the awkwardness of the setting. See some photos in the appendix.     
Table 1 describes the number of participants and in parenthesis the number of independent 
observations per treatment. 
  
 
13 For instance, with respect to the influence of alcohol, in sessions involving alcohol, participants were asked, “How 
inebriated did you feel during your negotiation?” which was rated on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all inebriated) to 
11 (very inebriated), “Do you think alcohol affected your negotiation?’ which was rated on a scale ranging from 1 
(not at all) to 11 (very much), and “Did alcohol consumption help or hurt your side of the negotiation?”. With 
respect to the negotiation process, participants were asked, “To reach an agreement, both of you made some 
concessions. In your negotiation, who made most of the concessions?” which was rated on a scale ranging from 1 (I 
made all the concessions) to 6 (both about the same) to 11 (the other person made all the concessions). 
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Table 1. Sample by treatment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Table 2 we show summary statistics by treatment for baseline characteristics. We focus on 
four observable characteristics of the participants: Gender, Size, Weight and Risk aversion 
(MPL). The differences are computed with respect the control treatment (No communication) 
where negative values indicate that the referred characteristic is larger in the treatment than in 
the control.  
With the exception of participants height in the Interaction treatment which is marginally larger 
(p=0.098) than in the No interaction, overall, the balance tests indicate that assignment to 
different treatments can be considered random, that is, there are not observable differences 
between participants allocated to different treatments compare to the control. The later means 
that the randomisation of participants across treatments worked properly. 
  
  
 Trust Recipr. Hard Easy 
No-Interaction 84  
(21) 
84  
(21) 
36  
(18) 
48 
(24) 
Interaction 76  
(19) 
76  
(19) 
36 
(18) 
40 
(20) 
StrComm 108 
 (27) 
108 
 (27) 
68 
(34) 
40 
(20) 
StrComm+W 100  
(25) 
100 
(25) 
56 
(28) 
44 
(22) 
StrComm+N 84  
(21) 
84  
(21) 
52 
(26) 
32 
(16) 
StrComm+W+N 84  
(21) 
84  
(21) 
44 
(22) 
40 
(20) 
Total 536 
(134) 
536 
(134) 
292 
(146) 
244 
(122) 
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Table 2. Balance tests 
 Mean Std. Dev. Difference p-value (T-test) 
No-Interaction     
Female 0.476190 0.502432 - - 
Height 1.717619 0.088407 - - 
Weight 65.14634 11.28325 - - 
Risk aversion 5.085366 1.664452 - - 
 
Interaction vs. No-Interaction 
    
Female 0.421052 0.497008 -0.05513 0.4870 
Height 1.740946 0.087510 0.02332 0.0983* 
Weight 66.15278 12.82785 1.00644 0.6052 
Risk aversion 5.226667 1.341372 0.14130 0.5612 
 
StrComm vs. No-Interaction 
    
Female 0.481481 0.501986 0.00529 0.9423 
Height 1.729796 0.092591 0.01217 0.3677 
Weight 65.18557 12.02283 0.03923 0.9822 
Risk aversion 5.267327 1.377615 0.18196 0.4195 
 
StrComm+W vs. No-Interaction 
    
Female 0.480000 0.502116 0.00380 0.9592 
Height 1.736869 0.094173 0.01925 0.1582 
Weight 64.52020 11.54294 -0.62614 0.7141 
Risk aversion 5.291667 1.541815 0.20630 0.3922 
 
StrComm+N vs. No-Interaction 
    
Female 0.380952 0.488537 -0.09523 0.2147 
Height 1.725542 0.084554 0.00792 0.5548 
Weight 65.73494 11.82194 0.58860 0.7440 
Risk aversion 4.792683 1.420640 -0.29268 0.2276 
 
StrComm+W+N vs. No-Interaction 
    
Female 0.428571 0.497843 -0.04761 0.5381 
Height 1.718571 0.095805 0.00095 0.9467 
Weight 65.98049 12.38404 0.83415 0.6527 
Risk aversion 5.025000 1.550623 -0.06036 0.8116 
Note: * significant at 10%. 
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4. Results 
This section explores four different outcomes from our experiments: hard negotiation 
(multidimensional), easy negotiation (bi-dimensional), trust and reciprocity. Our hard negotiation 
treatment exposes the participants to a bargaining situation where negotiations take place over 
different variables (wage, bonuses, etc.). As explained before we compare a series of 
environments: 
• No pre-play interaction at all (No Interaction). 
• Pre-play interaction without any communication structure (Interaction). 
• Pre-play interaction with StrComm (only water, only wine, water and nibbles or wine and 
nibbles). 
One first observation is that all negotiations (100% of the groups) reached an agreement (even if 
often away from the Pareto frontier), so there is no variation in that outcome, and we can 
conclude with: 
Result 0:  Pre-play interactions - be it through free or structured interactions, alcohol or 
nibbles - does not change the propensity of either hard or easy negotiation to 
reach an agreement. 
Table 3 presents the analysis for negotiation with all the treatments (including all the variants of 
StrComm and the amount received in the trust game, hereafter trust received). Its main interest is 
to show in one shot the main conclusion, namely that none of the treatments make any 
difference in negotiations. One can also see with this analysis that the treatments explain well the 
variation observed. The R2 is very high, indicating that our lack of significant results does not 
result from an insufficient sample to pick up nonzero effects. We can thus establish 
Result 1:  Pre-play interactions - be it through free or structured interactions, alcohol or 
nibbles - do not improve the efficiency of hard or easy negotiation. 
Table 3 reports the coefficients of the regression of negotiation points on the different 
treatments and other control variables (Model 1a). The reference category is the No Interaction 
in the Easy negotiation.  Note that No-Interaction hard is equivalent to a dummy for hard.  
One can see directly from the Table that none of the Easy negotiation treatments makes any 
improvement in terms of the negotiation outcomes. In a couple of the cases, interaction worsens 
the outcome. On the other hand, the Hard negotiations are different from the baseline, but as we 
will test more formally later (see subsection 4.a and Table 4), they are not different from one 
another. 
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Table 3. Negotiation regression - pooled sample. Note. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Endogenous variable: Negotiation points 1a 1b 1c 
 Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) 
Interaction -6.409*** (2.363) -3.477 (3.427)   
StrComm -4.087** (1.946) -2.894 (2.736)   
StrComm+W -1.877 (1.624) -1.127 (1.608)   
StrComm+N -2.015 (1.341) -5.772** (2.721)   
StrComm+W+N -3.568*** (1.308) -2.892 (1.814)   
No-Interaction * hard 24.622*** (2.202) 20.58*** (1.439)   
Interaction * hard 29.295*** (3.114) 23.08*** (3.854)   
StrComm * hard 25.854*** (2.009) 24.16*** (2.769)   
StrComm+W * hard 22.860*** (1.897) 20.90*** (2.081)   
StrComm+N * hard 26.323*** (2.056) 27.08*** (2.779)   
StrComm+W+N * hard 24.421*** (2.033) 24.89*** (3.229)   
No-Interaction * male   0.0442 (0.512)   
Interaction * male   -5.017 (4.387)   
StrComm * male   -2.665 (3.603)   
StrComm+W * male   -1.274 (2.890)   
StrComm+N * male   6.156** (2.787)   
StrComm+W+N * male   -1.259 (2.326)   
No-Interaction * hard * male    7.918** (3.769)   
Interaction * hard * male   10.55* (5.608)   
StrComm * hard * male   3.450 (3.915)   
StrComm+W * hard * male   3.515 (3.570)   
StrComm+N * hard * male   -1.265 (3.750)   
StrComm+W+N * hard * male   -1.004 (3.928)   
Employer 2.365** (1.256) 2.349** (1.169)   
Risk aversion -0.411 (0.318) -0.400 (0.343)   
Trust received 0.164 (0.186) 0.0976 (0.172)   
Male 1.045 (0.860)   1.063 (0.865) 
Hard     25.09*** (0.906) 
Constant 58.906*** (2.467) 60.02*** (2.364) 56.32*** (0.804) 
Obs. 516 516 536 
R2 0.605 0.617 0.571 
Adjusted R2 0.593 0.597 0.569 
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The analysis is repeated in Model 1b interacting with whether the group was all-male or all 
female. In this case the baseline is No-Interaction in all-female groups in the Easy negotiation. 
Note that No-Interaction male and No-Interaction hard are equivalent to dummies for male and 
hard respectively.  
There are two significant differences with respect to the No-Interaction benchmark in Model 1b 
arising from Easy negotiation - one negative and another positive, both at 5% (the latter can be 
seen in Table 4 which shows the Wald Test to compare whether estimated differences are 
significant with respect to the relevant baseline). For hard negotiation we also find two 
significant coefficients: one negative at 10% and another positive at 5%.  
All in all, we find only four exceptions, always at 5% or 10%. Two of the them are negative, 
meaning that the treatments are worse than the No-interaction benchmark and two positives, 
where the treatment outperforms the control. Remember that these four cases report 
interactions with gender treatments. 
Another way to see that the treatments are not useful to explain negotiation points is by looking 
at a regression of negotiation points just on the categorical variables Male and Hard (regression 
1c). The unadjusted R2 for Model 1a is very close to the one for 1a or 1b, and the adjusted R2 is 
virtually identical. 
Table 4. Wald Tests: Comparisons to baseline. 
Endogenous variable: Negotiation points  
1a 
 
1b 
 Diff. Coef. (SE) Diff Coef. (SE) 
     
Interaction * hard – No-Interaction * hard 4.673 (3.840) 2.501 (4.272) 
StrComm * hard – No-Interaction * hard 1.232 (3.039) 3.582 (3.101) 
StrComm+W * hard – No-Interaction * hard -1.762 (2.874) 0.322 (2.426) 
StrComm+N * hard – No-Interaction * hard 1.701 (2.918) 6.499** (3.282) 
StrComm+W+N * hard – No-Interaction * hard -0.200 (3.020) 4.307 (3.648) 
     
Interaction * male – No-Interaction * male   -5.060 (4.398) 
StrComm * male – No-Interaction * male   -2.709 (3.696) 
StrComm+W * male – No-Interaction * male   -1.318 (2.927) 
StrComm+N * male – No-Interaction * male   6.111** (2.872) 
StrComm+W+N * male – No-Interaction * male   -1.302 (2.371) 
     
Interaction * hard * male – No-Interaction * hard * male   2.633 (6.778) 
StrComm * hard * male – No-Interaction * hard * male   -4.468 (5.353) 
StrComm+W * hard * male – No-Interaction * hard * male   -4.403 (5.160) 
StrComm+N * hard * male – No-Interaction * hard * male   -9.182* (5.492) 
StrComm+W+N * hard * male – No-Interaction * hard * male   -8.922 (5.538) 
     
Note. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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4a) Hard negotiation 
Figure 2 top shows the total number of points obtained in the complex bargaining across 
treatment conditions. The last three bars of the same Figure 2 enrich the Interaction with 
Structured Communication treatment in order to mimic business meals. Figure 2 top already 
suggests what the regression analysis will show clearly: none of the treatments are different from 
the baseline without communication (No-Interaction). That is, it does not facilitate negotiations. 
All in all, the use of wine or nibbles or both does not appear to improve negotiations.  
Table 4 shows the Wald Test for the differences between the coefficients of the regression 
shown in Table 3 for the Hard treatments with respect to the baseline in which the negotiation is 
Hard and there is No-Interaction. Column 1a focuses on hard negotiation without separating by 
gender. The comparisons are done with respect to Interaction, StrComm, +Wine, +Nibbles and 
+Wine+Nibbles. We do not find any single positive and significant effect across the treatments. 
Column 1b repeats the same analysis but separates by gender groups. There is in this case a 
treatment which yield significant (at 5%) and positive effects StrComm+Nibbles in the female 
groups, and the opposite is true for males but marginally (p<0.1). Given that there is only one 
coefficient significant at conventional levels, and only in the heterogeneity analysis, we think the 
most likely explanation is the multiple hypotheses we test. 
Overall, none of our five treatments clearly outperforms the baseline of No-Interaction. Both 
males and females are better off with a perfect stranger and the introduction of any sort of 
socializing does not help to increase efficiency. Result 1a summarizes, 
Result 1a:  Pre-play interactions - be it through free or structured interactions, alcohol or 
nibbles - do not improve the efficiency of hard negotiation. 
Tables 3 and 4 show that most of the estimated coefficients are not statistically significant (or do 
not improve negotiation). This evidence suggests that interactions among participants does not 
improve the results of the negotiations.  However, the lack of significance of positive coefficients 
might be caused by the lack of power due to the number of observations.  
To check whether power is indeed a problem, we perform different power calculations. In model 
1a from Table 3 we have a power of 70% to find an average treatment effect (ATE) higher than 
4 negotiations points with respect No-Interaction * hard14. However, effects lower than 4 points 
are economically irrelevant since they represent an increase by less than 5% of the average 
 
14  We concentrate only in doing power calculations for positive coefficients, since they represent an improvement in 
negotiation. 
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negotiation points in the No-Interaction * hard. In model 1b we have less power (60%) due the 
triple interaction of treatments with hard and male. But again, positive coefficients are not 
particularly concerning. In the worst-case scenario, they represent an increase of less than 9% of 
the mean with respect to the reference group. 
Figure 2. Hard negotiation. Top: Results by treatment, Bottom: Results with respect to the Pareto frontier 
(in orange). 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.1 (in Appendix A) suggests an equivalent result separating by agent and employer. 
Notice that even though the points achieved by agent and employer are quite similar on average 
the distribution between them can vary quite a lot in the different pairs, as Figure 2 (bottom) 
makes clear. Table A.1 (Appendix A) shows that for neither agents nor employers no any 
treatment provide significant effects. Interacting with gender provides a single significant result 
at 5% but negative (see also Table A.2. for Wald Test).  
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Result 1b:  Pre-play interactions - be it through free or structured interactions, alcohol or 
nibbles - do not improve the amount of points obtained by either agents or employers of hard 
negotiation 
One reason for communication to be popular could be that it allows “clever” negotiators to 
obtain advantages. We would then not observe necessarily higher total points, but more 
“relative” benefit, and thus separate more from the equal division split. Table A.3 (columns 1a 
and 1b) confirm this observation measuring the distance from the equal distribution for the 
different treatments. 
Result 1c:  Pre-play interactions - be it through free or structured interactions, alcohol or 
nibbles - does not increase the dispersion in the distribution of points in the hard negotiation. 
Figure 2 (bottom) shows graphically how the different outcomes are located with respect to the 
Pareto frontier of the game. The frontier is represented in orange and the outcomes for all the 
different pairs are represented in different colour according to the treatment.  
Consistent with the results above 1a 1b and 1c, the colours/treatments are quite evenly spread 
inside the frontier and no colour dominates in any part of the graph. This merely confirms in a 
summary graphical way, the results 1a and 1b above. It also shows that generally, the outcomes 
are not efficient. This should not be surprising, there is a severe asymmetry of information and 
considerable cognitive complexity in the negotiation, which would make obtaining an efficient 
solution quite challenging. 
In order to understand if the lack of effects we observed were robust to the fact that we are 
only estimating an average treatment, we interact the treatment with the quantity of liquid 
consumption, which is a proxy for alcohol inebriation in the treatments with alcohol and found 
not qualitatively different results (details available upon request).  
All in all, results show that there is no effect of liquid consumption among wine treatments (no 
positive and significant treatment interaction terms).  
4b) Easy negotiation 
One possible explanation why social interaction does not have an effect for the hard negotiation 
is that the problem to solve may be too complex. With five issues to discuss, there are too many 
trade-offs, even if participants are genuinely disposed to have a more profiTable agreement. To 
test if this explanation had merit, we ran treatments where we simplified the very same 
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bargaining problem to two dimensions: wage and number of trips a month. Now participants 
only negotiate over these two dimensions. Figure 3 shows the results descriptively. We do not 
appreciate positive effects for pre-play interactions – structured or not –- on negotiation.  
Column 1a in Table 3 shows the econometric analysis establishing these results formally for the 
sample of all groups. Indeed the only significant treatments are negative. There are no 
treatments that are significantly better than No Interaction. Column 1b shows that for females 
StrComm+Nibbles yields negative results. In Table 4 we find that the opposite is marginally true 
for males. 
As in the case of hard negotiation, we have established the following result.  
Result 2a:  Pre-play interactions do not improve the outcome of easy negotiations. Result 1a 
is also replicated for easy negotiations. 
In this way, we reject the hypothesis that the reason why pre-play communication does not 
generate positive outcomes in negotiations is because they are complicated. 
In a similar way to what happens in hard negotiations, we also do not find that pre-play 
negotiations make a positive difference, for neither employers nor agents, as suggested in Figure 
A.2 and confirmed using regression analysis in Table A.1: No any significant and positive effect 
is found (see also Table A.2 for Wald Test). 
Regarding power, all the estimated coefficients in model 1a (Table 3) are negative for easy 
negotiation treatments indicating therefore that lack of power is not indeed a problem. In 
model 1b there only one positive coefficient (Nibbles + Male) which is significant at 5% (see 
also Wald test in Table 4). Therefore, our results are not driven by lack of power. 
Result 2b:  Pre-play interactions - be it through free or structured interactions, alcohol or 
nibbles, do not improve the amount of points obtained by either agents or 
employers of easy negotiation. 
In addition, as with the hard negotiations we do not find that the outcomes separate more from 
the equal division. We show this in Table A.1, columns 2a and 2b thus we have. 
Result 2c:  Pre-play interactions - be it through free or structured interactions, alcohol or 
nibbles - does not increase the dispersion in the distribution of points in the easy 
negotiation. 
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Figure 3. Easy negotiation. Top: Results by treatment, Bottom: Results with respect to the Pareto frontier (in 
orange). 
 
 
Let see how compares the easy negotiation with respect to the Pareto frontier. Figure 3 (bottom) 
shows the outcomes of the different environments. As for the Hard negotiation, it confirms 
visually the Results 2a, 2b and 2c above. But it also shows that the Easy negotiation environment 
makes the achievement of an efficient outcome much easier. A majority of the points are 
concentrated in the Pareto frontier. They are also quite symmetric as both players get very similar 
points. Clearly, the Easy environment makes the achievement of efficiency less daunting, 
showing the importance of information and cognitive constraints on negotiation. In that way we 
can conclude: 
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Result 2d:  Lowering the number of issues in negotiations, and thereby their cognitive costs, 
increases the efficiency of negotiations. 
This analysis reassures us that the treatments do not improve the results of the negotiations. 
 
c) Trust 
We might explain the absence of positive results for negotiations shown in previous section by 
the interplay of several factors. It might the case that alcohol makes people less thoughtful and 
more aggressive (Schweitzer and Gomberg, 2001), or that pre-play interaction makes participants 
less focused on the task (Yuan, Head, and Du 2003). In this section we will focus exclusively on 
trust among participants. Since trust might be a moderating factor in bargaining – we need trust 
to reach agreements – we will study now how our participants played the Trust Game using the 
same treatments as before. 
Figure 4 (top) shows the average trust behaviour across treatments. On the left side we show the 
baseline (No-Interaction) and moving to the right, treatments with an increasing number of 
characteristics. Table 5 (model 1a) analyses the same problem using double clustered regressions 
at individual and group level and several independent variables (the treatments), where the 
reference groups is the “No-Interaction*Female” treatment.  
One first observation is that the trust level is higher than observed in many previous 
experiments. A likely cause for this difference is the fact that trust is higher because our 
participants interact face-to-face, something that is known to increase trust (see e.g. Wilson et al. 
2006) and it is also quite realistic and appropriate given the situations we are trying to mimic. 
Apart of its intrinsic interest this result indicates that our effort in making the experimental 
setting natural was successful.  
Therefore, the trust resulting from the baseline (No-Interaction) is no different than the one 
resulting from the other treatments involving social interaction. The double cluster regression 
(see Table 5a) shows that social interactions do not help to enhance trust among females. For 
men, we find basically the same result. We run Wald Test to check whether estimated coefficient 
are significantly different from the control (No-Interaction) and we observe that none of them 
are providing positive and significant results for trust.  
Result 3 summarizes our findings about trust. 
Result 3: For both females and males, pre-play interactions - either free or structured ones, 
alcohol or nibbles - does not improve trust.  
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Figure 4. Trust (top) and Reciprocity (bottom) 
 
 
d) Reciprocity 
Finally, we study whether reciprocity is sensitive to the different types of social conditions.15 
Recall that reciprocity reflects the amount of money an individual would like to return to another 
participant who previously sent him/her some money. This measure can be also interpreted as 
gratitude. 
Our six treatments cover very different environments, ranging from pure strangers (no pre-play 
interaction) to a situation akin to a business meal (spending time with the other partner, 
communicating with him or her, having wine and some food). The question is whether different 
levels of interaction may create different levels of reciprocity.  
 
15 Twelve participants did not respond correctly to the Reciprocity questions. As a result, we lost some observations 
between the trust and reciprocity experiments. 
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We do not see effects of different forms of social interactions on reciprocity. Figure 4 (bottom) 
compares the average level of reciprocity among the six treatments. It is straightforward to check 
that the different forms of interaction we tried do not seem to outperform the complete stranger 
environment (no pre-play interaction).  
 
Table 5. Regression analysis (Double cluster. Individual and group level): Trust and Reciprocity 
     
Endogenous variables Trust received 
 
Reciprocity  
 1a 1b 
 Coef. (Std. dev.) Coef. (Std.dev.) 
     
Interaction 1.540 (1.316) -0.147** (0.0722) 
StrComm 0.206 (1.077) -0.0852 (0.0519) 
StrComm+W 2.020* (1.163) 0.0529 (0.0547) 
StrComm+N 1.563 (1.265) -0.0222 (0.0682) 
StrComm+W+N 0.824 (1.150) -0.00292 (0.0419) 
Risk aversion 0.00551 (0.0875) 0.00382 (0.00671) 
No-Interaction * male 2.380** (1.133) -0.0165 (0.0697) 
Interaction * male -1.490 (1.400) -0.0777 (0.0875) 
StrComm * male 2.682*** (0.726) 0.0557 (0.0613) 
StrComm+W * male 0.730 (0.969) -0.107 (0.0753) 
StrComm+N * male 1.223 (1.082) 0.0458 (0.0724) 
StrComm+W+N * male 0.133 (1.116) 0.0355 (0.0844) 
Constant 6.052*** (0.960) 0.397*** (0.0384) 
     
Obs. 516 506 
R2 0.158 0.124 
Adjusted R2 0.137 0.102 
Note. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 5 (model 1b) shows the results using a double cluster regression model. No single 
independent variable has a positive and significant impact in trust for either males or females. 
We may conclude as follows. 
Result 4: Pre-play interactions do not improve reciprocity. This is true both for male and 
female participants. 
 
  
 24 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have established that pre-play communication does not seem to help improve 
negotiation outcomes, neither at the aggregate session level, nor in the regression analysis, when 
we analyse more deeply the individual interactions. The lack of positive effects has been shown 
in a variety of conditions, with communication being more or less structured, accompanied or 
not by food and drink, and for both easy and hard negotiations. We have also shown that 
communication does not enhance trust, a possible pathway to improve negotiation outcomes 
As with any laboratory experiment, one potential limitation is the external validity of results. We 
believe this is less of a problem in our case. Our sample consists of business school students, 
from an elite business school, with tough exam entrance requirements. At the same time, they 
are also rather diverse and representative of the French society since as we mention in the design 
section many are recipients of social scholarships and the diversity index is the third highest in 
France. They most likely understand they will be negotiators in the future and many of whom 
have had internships prior to starting their studies and have an appreciation of the business 
world. They are clearly the kind of people that will do high level negotiations in the future.  
One could argue that in an even more diverse setting, perhaps with people from very different 
socio-cultural origins, the results could be different. That is certainly a possibility worth studying 
in future research, but at a minimum we have established that an unqualified recommendation to 
“try to forge a personal connection by meeting for an informal lunch or two” is certainly not warranted.  
Similarly, it could be argued that in reality it is often one party who invites the other to the 
informal lunch, and perhaps the act of taking the trouble to call up and invite the other party to 
the informal communication signals some important personality trait on that party. Again, that is 
an interesting conjecture that is worth exploring, but even if so, our research shows that it is not 
the act of communicating per se which improves negotiation, but rather something else, the 
signalling.  
On the other hand, our experiment mimics quite well the real business meal. We fixed the 
starting time of all experimental sessions was at the very same time (11 AM). This was done for 
two reasons: first, to prevent heterogeneity effects on participants due to glucose (see Danziger 
et al 2011); second, the timing of the trust and negotiation activities (which happened after the 
allocation of participants in the rooms and the interaction phase) occurred about noon, which is 
very close to real business lunchtime in France. Indeed, we made an extra effort so that the 
setting was a bit more casual. We allocated desks and participants in circles of four facing each 
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other and they apparently enjoyed their experience. The unexpected high level of trust observed 
in the entire experiment might be explained by the relaxed atmosphere. 
Finally, the policy implications of the paper are very significant. While it would be premature to 
change the tax codes and practices of many countries based on a single study, we would 
recommend that tax authorities to pay a lot more attention to the fact that the business lunch, or 
dinner, could be a form of untaxed in-kind compensation to employees leaking out of badly 
stretched public finances. 
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Appendix A: 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure A.1: Results for Hard negotiation (males and females): agent (left) and employer (right) 
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Figure A.2: Results for Easy negotiation (males and females): agent (left) and employer (right) 
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Table A.1: Regression analysis (Double cluster. Individual and group level): Hard and Easy negotiation (Agent and Employer) 
 Agent  Employer 
 1a  1b  1a  1b 
 Coef. (Std. dev.)  Coef. (Std. dev.)  Coef. (Std. dev.)  Coef. (Std. dev.) 
Interaction -6.287** (2.488)  -2.866 (3.261)  -5.757** (2.345)  -3.307 (3.543) 
StrComm -3.613 (2.483)  0.299 (3.373)  -3.989* (2.304)  -5.767 (3.892) 
StrComm+W -1.532 (2.065)  0.555 (2.354)  -1.568 (1.526)  -1.882 (1.636) 
StrComm+N -1.559 (1.908)  -5.558** (2.777)  -2.078 (1.449)  -5.590** (2.697) 
StrComm+W+N -4.598*** (1.605)  -4.626 (3.084)  -2.013 (1.500)  -0.739 (1.526) 
No-Interaction * hard 21.98*** (2.949)  18.35*** (4.028)  27.72*** (3.355)  22.82*** (3.427) 
Interaction * hard 26.59*** (4.535)  24.38*** (5.409)  31.69*** (3.818)  20.70*** (4.199) 
StrComm * hard 20.89*** (3.333)  14.80*** (5.572)  30.69*** (3.590)  34.20*** (6.257) 
StrComm+W * hard 20.26*** (3.308)  13.82*** (4.164)  25.01*** (2.244)  27.69*** (2.223) 
StrComm+N * hard 22.33*** (2.877)  24.40*** (4.029)  30.38*** (2.643)  29.78*** (3.691) 
StrComm+W+N * hard 23.26*** (4.357)  27.40*** (8.310)  25.36*** (4.058)  22.17*** (7.280) 
No-Interaction * male    1.051 (1.132)     -1.168 (1.052) 
Interaction * male    -5.409 (4.345)     -4.893 (4.380) 
StrComm * male    -7.442* (4.217)     2.204 (4.640) 
StrComm+W * male    -2.543 (3.462)     -0.608 (2.812) 
StrComm+N * male    7.603** (3.161)     4.598 (2.932) 
StrComm+W+N * male    0.319 (3.190)     -2.796 (2.259) 
No-Interaction * hard * male     6.490 (5.276)     10.40* (5.740) 
Interaction * hard * male    3.542 (8.463)     18.21*** (5.838) 
StrComm * hard * male    12.30* (6.479)     -6.573 (7.510) 
StrComm+W * hard * male    12.78** (5.896)     -5.318 (4.126) 
StrComm+N * hard * male    -3.502 (5.435)     1.071 (4.873) 
StrComm+W+N * hard * male    -7.123 (8.966)     5.025 (8.446) 
Risk aversion -1.006** (0.480)  -1.035* (0.549)  -0.00150 (0.426)  0.236 (0.445) 
Trust received 0.492 (0.323)  0.226 (0.292)  -0.0255 (0.288)  0.0253 (0.273) 
Constant 61.67*** (3.650)  63.45*** (3.453)  59.19*** (3.329)  58.20*** (3.103) 
            
Obs. 259  259  257  257 
R2 0.539  0.572  0.681  0.706 
Adjusted R2 0.515  0.538  0.664  0.682 
Note: (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Reference group: No-Interaction
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Table A.2: Wald tests - Comparisons to baseline: 
 Agent Employer 
 1a 1b 1a 1b 
 Diff. Coef. (Std. dev.) Diff Coef. (Std. dev.) Diff. Coef. (Std. dev.) Diff Coef. (Std. dev.) 
Interaction * hard – No-Interaction * hard 4.605 (5.521) 6.032 (6.847) 3.964 (5.035) -2.120 (5.609) 
StrComm * hard – No-Interaction * hard  -1.094 (4.665) -3.547 (7.008) 2.966 (5.059) 11.385 (7.304) 
StrComm+W * hard – No-Interaction * hard -1.724 (4.485) -4.529 (5.739) -2.717 (3.988) 4.873 (4.004) 
StrComm+N * hard – No-Interaction * hard 0.343 (4.104) 6.051 (5.849) 2.655 (4.132) 6.963 (5.195) 
StrComm+W+N * hard – No-Interaction * hard 1.276 (5.007) 9.055 (8.989) -2.360 (5.260) -0.645 (7.989) 
         
Interaction * male – No-Interaction * male   -6.460 (4.478)   -3.725 (4.515) 
StrComm * male – No-Interaction * male   -8.493* (4.408)   3.371 (4.888) 
StrComm+W * male – No-Interaction * male   -3.594 (3.672)   0.560 (0.852) 
StrComm+N * male – No-Interaction * male   6.551* (3.432)   5.766* (3.159) 
StrComm+W+N * male – No-Interaction * male   -0.732 (3.405)   -1.628 (2.474) 
         
Interaction * hard * male – No-Interaction * hard * male   -2.948 (9.787)   7.813 (8.262) 
StrComm * hard * male – No-Interaction * hard * male   5.809 (8.406)   -16.969* (9.581) 
StrComm+W * hard * male – No-Interaction * hard * male   6.292 (7.782)   -15.714** (7.091) 
StrComm+N * hard * male – No-Interaction * hard * male   -9.991 (7.710)   -9.325 (7.678) 
StrComm+W+N * hard * male – No-Interaction * hard * male   -13.613 (10.351)   -5.371 (10.114) 
Note: (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Reference group: No-Interaction 
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Table A.3: Distance from individual outcome to pair equally distributed payoffs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Average (standard deviation) 
  
 Hard  Easy  
 Male 
1a 
Female 
1b 
 Male 
2a 
Female 
2b 
 
No-Interaction 0.5 
(0.05) 
0.5 
(0.06) 
 0.5 
(0.02) 
0.5 
(0.01) 
 
Interaction 0.5 
(0.06) 
0.5 
(0.049) 
 0.49 
(0.02) 
0.5 
(0) 
 
StrComm. 0.5 
(0.05) 
0.5 
(0.097) 
 0.5 
(0.07) 
0.5 
(0.05) 
 
StrComm.+W 0.5 
(0.06) 
0.5 
(0.08) 
 0.5 
(0.01) 
0.5 
(0.01) 
 
StrComm.+N 0.5 
(0.08) 
0.5 
(0.06) 
 0.5 
(0.02) 
0.5 
(0.01) 
 
StrComm.+W+N 0.5 
(0.06) 
0.5 
(0.11) 
 0.5 
(0.01) 
0.5 
(0.03) 
 
Total 0.5 
(0.06) 
0.5 
(0.08) 
 0.49 
(0.03) 
0.5 
(0.03) 
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Experimental instructions – Negotiation game (Hard, employer) 
 
Player 1 
In this game, you will only interact with player 2. Player 3 interacts with player 4. 
 
You will engage in a discussion process to potentially hire a candidate. His CV appears at the bottom of 
this page. In this process, you are the employer who received the CV for this candidate from a human 
resources agent, which role is adopted by Player 2. You must discuss and agree together on an agreement. 
The action takes place in 1996. 
 
You have offered the following position: 
 
We are looking for entry-level candidates for a position as a geologist. The candidate should be familiar 
with modern methods of construction and drilling. The project will consist of the analysis of the large 
building’s foundations and will involve a significant number of trips. We offer a competitive salary and a 
mutual insurance package will probably be available. 
 
You must find an agreement on five different contract characteristics: salary, signing bonus received by 
the candidate, starting date, type of mutual insurance, number of trips to achieve per month. To reach an 
agreement, both sides (you and the agent) have to declare their coincidence at each of the five 
characteristics. Each line contains the number of points you earn by selecting it. For the agent, the 
number of points at each line is different, so this information (conversion into points) must 
remain strictly private. 
 
Your total points will be calculated by adding the points you have successfully obtained on each of the 
five characteristics. 
 
At the end of the experiment, your points will be converted into euros at the rate of 10 points = 1 euro. 
 
You have 15 minutes of discussion, and then you will have to answer a series of questions concerning the 
contract you have chosen. Here is the candidate's CV: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here is your private negotiation grid, with conversion into points: 
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 Points 
Salary (in euros)  
26000 50 
28000 45 
30000 40 
32000 35 
34000 30 
36000 25 
38000 20 
40000 15 
  
Signing bonus (in euros)  
0 0 
1000 5 
2000 10 
4000 8 
6000 4 
8000 0 
  
Starting date  
4 weeks 25 
6 weeks 10 
8 weeks 5 
1é weeks 0 
  
Mutual assurance decision  
Refuse mutual option 25 
Mutual paid by the company at 50% 15 
Mutual paid by the company at 100% 0 
  
Number of trips per month  
1 0 
2 10 
3 25 
4 40 
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Supplementary Material: 
Photos of the session 
